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JURISDICTION 
This Court has "original jurisdiction over the question of state law" 
certified by the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2-2(l)(2001). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Judge Tena Campbell of the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah certified the following question of law: 
Whether a federal government employee, who ordinarily 
would be immune from suit in cases of strict liability, may be 
liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plaintiffs establish 
negligence. 
(Appellant's Addendum at tab 2.) 
The Millers submit that the question certified requires this Court to answer 
the following two questions of Utah law: 
1. Whether the common law of Utah recognizes a right of action by a 
third party against a seller of alcoholic beverages, who is not subject to the 
provisions of Utah's Dramshop Act, when the third party has suffered injury at 
the hands of an intoxicated person and where the seller negligently continued to 
serve the intoxicated person in violation of Utah's statutory prohibition. 
2. Whether, provided there is a such a third-party common law cause of 
action against negligent sellers of alcoholic beverages, who are not subject to the 
1 
provisions of Utah's Dramshop Act, Utah's Dramshop Act preempt such causes of 
action. 
RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party. 
UTAH CONST., Art. I, § 11. 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation. 
UTAH CONST., Art. I, § 24. 
A copy of this statute was attached at addendum tab 1 of 
Appellant's Opening Brief 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.) 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The U.S. is attempting to avoid responsibility for its negligent and wrongful 
acts by exploiting what it perceives as a loophole in interaction between the law of 
Utah and the law of the United States. Utah common law currently recognizes a 
third-party action against negligent vendor's of alcohol, although there is some 
dispute concerning the exact nature of this common law right. This Court should 
resolve any conflict in favor of the laws and policies of Utah. 
At common law an negligence action accrues against another, when one 
suffers an injury, which is proximately caused by the breach of a duty by another. 
The U.S. had a duty not to serve alcohol to an already intoxicated man, which 
existed because one could foresee the likelihood of injury and because serving an 
intoxicated person is against the law. The U.S. Government breached this duty 
and the Millers were injured as a result. The question of legal or proximate cause 
amounts to whether the result was foreseeable and whether it was a substantial 
factor in causing the harm. The Millers injuries were substantially caused by the 
U.S. Government's failure to stop serving an intoxicated man alcohol. The 
Millers' claims all elements of claims for common law negligence, and this Court 
should recognize the Millers' common law claims. 
This Court has stated that Utah's Dram Shop Act preempts the common 
law of negligence insofar as it imposes liability for acts the Act reaches; however 
the common law is not preempted as to the U.S. Government because the Act does 
3 
not reach the acts of the government in buying and selling alcohol. This is 
because the Act imposes strict liability and federal law prohibits applying strict 
liability to the U.S. Government. Further, the Act does not preempt the common 
law as it applies to the U.S. Government, because the legislature did not intent to 
apply the Act to the U.S. Government. Finally, the Act does not preempt the 
common law as the U.S. Government, because such an interpretation of the Act 
would be unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution. 
Application of the common law to third-party tort claims, for acts not 
reached by the Act, is consistent with the previous rulings of this court, the intent 
of the legislature in enacting the Act, the public policy of the State of Utah, the 
jurisprudence of several sister states, the well established policy of the courts of 
Utah and the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, this 
Court should answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that a 
federal government employee, who ordinarily would be immune from suit in cases 
of strict liability, may be liable under the principles of common law, under Utah's 
Dramshop Act, if the plaintiffs establish negligence. 
4 
ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY 
The U.S. Government is attempting to avoid responsibility for its negligent 
and wrongful acts, arguing that the U.S. Government is immune from liability for 
the wrongful and negligent acts and omissions of its employee by operation of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act in relation to the strict liability imposed by Utah's 
Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann. 32A-14-101 (1999 RepL). 
Under Utah law a vendor who negligently and wrongfully provides alcohol 
to another may be liable to a third-party for injuries suffered as a result of the 
vendor's negligent and wrongful provision of alcohol. S!ee Rees v. Albertson's, 
Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978); Utah Code Ann. §32A-14-101 (1999 RepL). This 
Court has explicitly recognized that a cause of action accrues to "a third person 
against a vendor of alcohol who sells the same negligently and in violation of a 
statute to an underage purchaser, who becomes intoxicated and causes injury to 
the third person." MacKav v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp.. 2000 UT 15, [^9, 995 P.2d 
1233. See also Rees v. Albertson's, Inc.; Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah 
1981). Conversely, this Court has stated that "there is no common law basis to 
support a third-party negligence claim against" vendors of alcohol. Adkins v. 
Uncle Bart's, Inc., 2000 UT 14, ^ 20, 1 P.3d 528, 533, cert denied, 531 U.S. 1011 
(2000). This Court should resolve this seeming conflict in a manner that promotes 
the public policy and law of the State of Utah1 and recognize that a vendor who 
1
 See Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 (1953). 
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negligently and wrongfully serves alcohol to an intoxicated person, who the 
vendor knew or should have known was intoxicated, may be liable to a third 
person for injuries suffered as a result of the vendor's negligent and wrongful acts. 
I. COMMON LAW LIABILITY TO A THIRD-PARTY FOR 
NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF ALCOHOL TO ANOTHER 
As a general rule, "at common law, one who suffers injury to his person or 
property because of the negligence of another has a right of action in tort." Payne 
v. Myers , 743 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1987)(citation omitted). "Under traditional 
tort analysis, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, the breach of 
which proximately causes injury to the plaintiff." Id. See Restatement (Second) 
of Torts §281 (1965). Thus, under the traditional principles of common law, a 
right of action in tort accrues to the Millers against the U.S. Government, if 1) the 
U.S. Government employee had a duty to discontinue serving alcohol to Mr. 
Valle, when the U.S. Government employee knew or should have known Mr. 
Valle was intoxicated and 2) the U.S. Government employee's continued service 
of alcohol to an already inebriated Mr. Valle proximately caused the Millers' 
injuries. Furtheri, "questions relating to negligence and proximate cause are 
generally for the trier of fact . . . to determine." Rees, atl33. "When there is a 
doubt about the existence of proximate cause and negligence, it should be resolved 
by allowing the case to go to trial." MacKay, at ]fl2, 1236 (citing Rees). 
A. The U.S. Government Had A Duty To Stop Serving Alcohol To Mr. 
Valle After He Became Intoxicated. 
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Under common law principles, a duty exists if the Court determines that "as 
a matter of law, the tort-feasor could have anticipated the harm to the plaintiff." 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 778 (Utah (Durham, J. 
dissenting)(citing Rest. 2d Torts § 281 comment c (1965)). In addition, a duty 
may be created by legislative enactment, which modifies the common law. See 
Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18121,70 P.3d 78, 83 ("It is a well-recognized 
principle that the common law may be modified by statute or ordinance."). In this 
case the U.S. Government had a duty to stop serving Mr. Valle after he became 
intoxicated, both because the harm to the Millers was a foreseeable result of 
serving alcohol to an intoxicated person and because, under Utah law, a duty 
exists to not serve alcohol to intoxicated persons in bars and clubs. 
1. A duty to discontinue serving alcohol to already 
intoxicated patrons existed because the resulting harm 
was foreseeable. 
In determining whether or not a duty exists, "Utah follows the 
foreseeability rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and followed by 
a majority of states." Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55,5J7, 985 P.2d 
892, 894. In order for a duty to exist under this formulation of reasonable 
foreseeability, it must "be reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident 
7 
would occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of the same 
general nature." Regs, at 133.2 See also 
Here, the likelihood that the intoxicated patron of the U.S. Government's 
on-base N.C.O. Club would be involved in an automobile accident after he left the 
base was reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, the U.S. Government had a duty, 
under common law principles to stop serving Mr. Valle after he became 
intoxicated. 
2. A duty to discontinue serving already intoxicated 
patrons existed under Utah law. 
It is well-recognized "that the common law may be modified by statute or 
ordinance." Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18 121, 70 P.3d 78, 83. Laws, 
ordinances and regulations provide a model of expected behavior, and may be 
adopted as the standard of care, provided that "the purpose of the statute was to 
protect a class of persons of which" the injured party is a member from the type of 
harm which resulted. Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991) (applying 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286, § 288 (1965)). Although, violation of the 
standard of care established by statute or regulation does not raise to the level of 
negligence per se until the standard if formally adopted by the court, "violation of 
2
 Recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the issue of foreseeability in 
relation a third-party action for negligent and wreckless infliction of emotional 
distress: "It seems self-evident that the serving of alcoholic beverages to an 
obviously intoxicated person by one who knows or reasonably should know that 
such intoxicated person intends to operate a motor vehicle creates a reasonably 
foreseeable risk of injury to those on the roadways." Craig v. Driscoll 813 A.2d 
1001, 1020 (Conn. 2002) 
8 
a standard of safety set by statute or ordinance is prima facie evidence of 
negligence." Id., fh 4. 
Title 32A of the Utah Code, Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, was 
enacted under the State's police powers to further public "health, peace, safety and 
morals." Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-103 (1999 Repl.) (Title 32A enacted to protect 
"health, peace, safety, welfare, and morals" of Utah citizens.). It includes 
provisions for both civil liability3 and criminal liability4, for providing alcoholic 
beverages to persons who appear to be intoxicated.5 The U.S. Government 
employee of the Air Force NCO Club violated this standard of care and conduct 
by continuing to serve Mr. Valle after he was obviously intoxicated. Accordingly, 
the US Government's violation of the strictures of the Act is evidence of that it 
breached its duties to the Millers. 
Further, following this reasoning, this Court should adopt the standards of 
Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act as duty owed by providers of alcohol in 
this State, consistent with § 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, thereby 
establishing a violation of the provisions of the Act as negligence per se. It is 
3
 Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.). 
4
 "A person man not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply any alcoholic 
beverage or product to any person who is apparently under the influence of 
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or to a person whom the 
person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or should have know from the 
circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or 
products or drugs." Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204 (1999 Repl.). 
5
 "Any person who violates this title or the commission rules adopted under this 
title is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided in this title." 
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-104 (1999 Repl.). 
9 
obvious that furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated person - a person deemed by law 
to lack the judgment to drink responsibly - poses a threat to public safety, and the 
Act unquestionably reflects a legislative concern for the dangers attendant to (or 
inherent in) the sale of alcohol. Utah's Alcoholic Beverage control Act exists to 
protect Mr. and Mrs. Miller -members of the public—from the type of injuries 
that they sustained, in the manner that they sustained them, to wit, an auto accident 
caused by an intoxicated driver who had been negligently and wrongfully 
provided alcohol after he was visibly and obviously intoxicated. 
The U.S. Government has a duty in common sense, under the common law 
principle of reasonable foreseeability and pursuant to Utah statutory law not to 
serve customers in its bar and clubs after those customers become intoxicated. 
B. The U.S. Government's Negligent Serving Of Alcohol To An 
Obviously Intoxicated Patron Was The Proximate Cause Of The 
Millers9 Injuries. 
In the common law, a negligent or wrongful act is the proximate cause 
when it is the act that "necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the 
injury." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). "To establish 
proximate cause" a plaintiff must prove that the conduct complained of "was a 
substantial causative factor leading to his injury." McCorvev v. Utah State Dept. 
of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993). As a general rule, "proximate cause is 
and issue for the jury to decide." Id. Only when reasonable minds can draw only 
one inference from the evidence presented does proximate cause become a 
10 
question of law to be determined by the Court. See Rees, 587 P.2d at 133; 
Harline, at 439. 
1. Traditional rule 
Traditionally, at common law, third-party claims against one who 
negligently furnishes liquor for damages caused by the person intoxicated by the 
liquor were barred. Yost 1047, fn 2. The reasons advanced for this prohibition 
were that the drinking of the alcohol was a subsequent intervening cause, which 
was the proximate cause of the injury, and that "the later injury to another was 
thought to be an unforeseeable result of providing the liquor." Ono v. Applegate, 
612 P.2d 533, 537 (Haw. 1980). These common law rationales are dated, based in 
an age of horses and carriages and not the fast-paced age we live in where an 
"imbiber going upon the public highways" is "capable of producing mass death 
and destruction." Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54 (1969). 
It is axiomatic that automobile accidents are the foreseeable result of 
intoxicated driving. With the risks raising to the level of common knowldege, the 
assumption that the ingestion of the alcohol is a sufficient intervening force to 
obviate all liability of the one providing the alcohol is counter to accepted 
common law principles in which a "tortious act by a third party does not act as an 
intervening force if such acts are within the scope of the risk created." Craig v. 
Driscoll 813 A.2d 1001, 1017 (Conn. 2002). Indeed, this Court has recognized 
11 
that by improperly providing alcohol to another one may proximately cause injury 
to a third-person. See Rees, at 133; Yost at 1047; MacKav, at [^12, 1246. 
The hazards and the awareness of the age have made archaic the old 
common law rule of third-party liability. 
2. Evolution of The Traditional Rule 
The general rule that a common law negligence action could not be brought 
by a third-party against the person who provided alcohol to another began in the 
middle of the last century. In 1959, New Jersey Supreme Court held that a third 
party injured by an intoxicated person could bring a negligence action against the 
commercial vendor who sold the inebriate the alcohol. Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 
A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959). Since Rappaport, most courts have abandoned the old 
common law rule as being "antiquated and illogical." Brigance v. Velvet Dove 
Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 302 (Okl 1986).6 Additionally, many states that 
already had enacted the dramshop acts, including Utah, have recognized a new 
common law right of action against commercial vendors and have permitted 
6
 See Nazareno v. Urie. 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Ontiveros v. Borak. 557 P.2d 
200 (Ariz. 1983); Ono v. Applegate. 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980);Michnik-
Zilberman v. Gordon's Liquor. Inc., 453 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. 1983); Campbell v. 
Carpenter. 566 P.2d 893 (Or. 1977); Jardine v. Upper Derby Lodge No. 1973. Inc.. 
198 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1964); Sorensen v. Jarvis. 350 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1984); 
Pfieifer v. Copper stone Restaurant and Lounge. 693 P.2d 644 (Or. App. 1985); 
Veselv v. Sager. 486 P.2d 151 (Calif. 1971); Deeds v. U.S.. 306 F.Supp. 348 (D. 
Mont. 1969). 
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plaintiffs to recover in negligence, even where their claim would be barred by the 
Dramshop Act provisions.7 
Two decision, made over twenty years apart by court on far sides of this 
country epitomize the thoughtful evolution of the common law of third-party 
liability mandated by changing circumstances, Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533, 
decided in 1980 by the Supreme Court of Hawaii, and Craig v. Driscoll 813 A.2d 
1003, decided in 2002 by the Supreme Court of Connecticut. 
In Ono, the plaintiff was woman who was injured when the automobile 
driven by a man who had been intoxicated before going to a tavern, where he 
continued to drink, crossed the middle of the road and struck the auto in which she 
was a passenger head-on, killing two of the occupants and seriously the plaintiff. 
The defendant tavern's motion to dismiss was denied, and the defendant appealed 
the apportionment of fault. At issue on appeal was the question, "whether a 
person who in injured by an inebriated automobile driver may recover, in the 
absence of dram shop legislation, from the tavern that provided alcohol to the 
driver in violation of [Hawaii's] liquor control law." Id. at 537. 
7
 See Mullis v. Monroe. 505 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. 1998); Largo Corp. v. Crespin. 727 
P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1986); Connolly v. Conlon. 371 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1985); Thaut 
v. Finlev. 213 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. 1973); Trail v. Christian. 213 N.W.2d 618 
(Minn. 1973); Berkeley v. Park. 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965); Hutchens v. Hankins. 
303 S.E.2d 584 (N.C. 1983); Mason v. Roberts. 294 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1973); 
Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores. Inc.. 854 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1993); Brigance v. 
Velvet Dove Restaurant. Inc.. 725 P.2d 300, 302-03 (Okla. 1986). 
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The court examined the reasoning of Vesely v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 (Calif. 
1971), wherein the California Supreme Court stated "that the consumption of 
liquor, the resulting intoxication, and the injury-producing conduct were 
foreseeable intervening causes which would not relieve the tavern of liability. Id. 
(citing Vesely at 159). Noting with approval the reasoning in Vesely and the clear 
trend in "[o]ther jurisdictions, that in the absence or inapplicability of dram shop 
legislation" had allowed recovery against taverns "for injuries received by a third 
person as a result of a customer's intoxication," the Ono court was persuaded that 
"a person injured by an inebriated tavern customer" should be permitted recovery 
at common law, provided the plaintiff proves negligence. Id. at 538. 
In defining the common law duty of the tavern, the court, employing the 
standard set for in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, determined that the liquor 
control act imposed a duty on the tavern "not to serve a person under the influence 
of alcohol." Id. at 539. On the issue of proximate cause, the court a held that "in 
light of the universal use of automobiles and the increasing frequency of accidents 
involving drunk drivers," a tavern owner should reasonably foresee "the 
consequences of serving liquor;" thus, "the consumption, resulting inebriation and 
injurious conduct are therefore foreseeable intervening acts which will not relieve 
the tavern of liability. " Id at 538-39. 
Similar Ono, the issue in this case is whether to allow common law 
recovery for negligently providing liquor to an intoxicated person, in violation of 
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Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, in the absence of Dramshop liability. As 
in Ono, the U.S. Government N.C.O. Club had a duty to not serve intoxicated 
patrons. Under the reasoning Ono, the U.S. Government should reasonable 
foresee that persons who become intoxicated at the N.C.O. Club are likely to be 
involved auto accidents, like the one that seriously injured the Millers and that it is 
the breach of the duty is a proximate cause of resulting automobile accidents. 
In Craig v. Driscoll the Connecticut court dealt with the issue of whether, 
notwithstanding Connecticut's Dram Shop Act, the common law recognizes 
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against a purveyor of alcoholic 
beverages made by the mother and brother of a pedestrian who was run down by 
the intoxicated patron of the purveyor's establishment. 813 A.2d at 1006. The 
Craig court undertook a thorough analysis of preemption by the Dram Shop Act, 
the common law, the effect of the Act upon the common law and strength of the 
reasoning behind extant proximate cause jurisprudence. Id. Making way for the 
common law cause of action outside the Act's consideration, the court expressly 
rejected the "fiction that the behavior of anyone who is under the influence of 
alcohol is automatically, as a matter of law, an intentional intervening act that 
relieves the liability of a vendor of alcohol even though the vendor's negligence is 
otherwise established." Id. at 1022. 
Similarly, this Court should further embrace the notion that, whether or not 
the person under the influence is a minor, the behavior of an intoxicated person is 
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not of necessity an intervening cause of injury to a third person, when a purveyor 
of alcohol continues to serve alcohol to the intoxicated person 
The U.S. negligently and wrongfully continued to serve alcohol to an 
obviously and visibly intoxicated Arthur Valle. The intoxicated Mr. Valle then 
left the Club and drove his vehicle onto the roads of Utah where he collided with 
the Millers' vehicle, severely and permanently injuring the Millers. This accident 
was the foreseeable result of the intoxication enabled and caused by the negligent 
over-serving by the U.S. Under traditional common law principles, the U.S. is 
liable to the Millers', insofar as the Millers' injuries were caused by its negligent 
acts or omissions. The Millers' claim of negligence against the U.S. and the facts 
of this case satisfy all elements of claims for common law negligence and 
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and this Court should recognize the 
Millers' common law claims. 
II. THE COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS 
NOT PREEMPTED BY UTAH'S DRAMSHOP ACT. 
In Gilger v. Hernandez, this Court explored the extent of preemption of the 
common law by Utah's Dramshop Act. 2000 UT 23, 997 P.2d 305. The Court 
explained the relationship between common law liability and limited Dramshop 
liability as a trade-off, whereby 
[T]he legislature assured those who were subjected to 
dramshop liability that they would not be subject to common 
law negligence liability and that this statutory liability would 
be limited, something that exposure to common law 
negligence liability would not have provided. 
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Id., at }^ 13, 310. The Court concluded, "that the common law of negligence is 
preempted insofar as it may impose liability for acts that the Dramshop Act 
reaches'' Id (emphasis added). This holding gives rise to the logical inference 
that common law liability is not preempted for acts that are not reached by Utah's 
Dramshop Act, where no trade-off between limited liability and common law 
liabililty took place. 
The Utah's Dramshop Act does reach the acts U.S. Government or its 
employees in procuring and selling alcoholic beverages. The U.S. Government is 
not liable under the Utah's Dramshop Act through the operation of the Federal 
Tort Claims Act, and there was no trade-off between the protections of the Act and 
the common law. Moreover, the Utah legislature did not intend for Utah's 
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, including Dramshop, to apply to the U.S. 
Govemmenet. Accordingly, Utah's Dramshop Act does not preempt the common 
law liability of the U.S. Government. 
A. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Utah's Dramshop Act Does Not 
Reach Acts Of U.S. Government Employees. 
Under the doctrine of federal preemption and through the operation of the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, Utah's Dramshop Act does not reach the acts of the U.S. 
Government U.S. Government. If the United States' assertion is correct, Utah's 
Dramshop Act creates a regime of strict but limited liability for those who violate 
its provisions; however, the through the operation of federal preemption and the 
Federal Tort Claims Act, the provision and liability of the Act do not reach the 
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acts of U.S. Government employee. Accordingly, the common law of negligence, 
as to the U.S. Government, is not preempted by the Dramshop Act8. 
1. Strict Liability of Utah's Dramshop Act 
This Court has held that Utah's Dramshop Act imposes a form of strict 
liability. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 117 (Utah 1991). Notwithstanding the 
allocation of comparative fault, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2), the Act still 
"prescribes a form of strict liability." Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT at 
^[11. See also Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Accordingly, Utah's Dramshop Act is a 
strict liability statute, 
2. Liability of the U.S. Government Under the FTCA 
The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the governmental immunity of the 
U.S. Government for claims for money damages "for injury or loss of property, or 
personal injury or death" when that injury or loss of property is "caused by the 
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employees of the Government" 
acting in the scope and course of employment, "if a private person, would be liable 
to the claimant" under "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred." 
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The United States Supreme Court has determined that the 
FTCA's broad waiver of immunity does "not authorize the imposition of strict 
8
 Of course, if there was no common law liability for serving liquor to a clearly 
intoxicated individual, there would be nothing for the Dramshop Act to preempt. 
Such is a clear recognition by the Mackay Court that there is common law 
negligence for selling liquor to someone that is clearly intoxicated. See Mackay v. 
7-Eleven Sales Corp., 995 P.2d 1233 (Utah 2000)(recognizing cause of action for 
negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of prescribed law). 
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liability of any sort upon the Government." Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 804, 92 
S.Ct. 1899, 1902 (1972) (restating rule announced in Dalehite v. United States, 
346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956(1953)). 
Utah's Dramshop Act prescribes a form of strict liability. The U.S. 
Government has denied any application of liability without fault. Thus, the Act 
does not reach the acts of the U.S. Government. Since, the Act does not reach the 
U.S, Government, no exchange of limited strict liability for the liability of the 
common law could have taken place. Accordingly and because the Act does not 
reach the acts of the U.S. Government and because there was no exchange of 
common law liability for limited strict liability, the Act does not preempt the 
common law as to the U.S. Government. 
B. The Utah Legislature Did Not Intent Utah's Dramshop Act To 
Preempt The Common Law As To The U.S. Government. 
Utah's Dramshop Act does not preempt common law liability of the actions 
of the U.S. Government. Utah has adopted the preemption model developed by 
the United States Supreme Court "for determining preemptive intent." Gilger v. 
Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, f 11, 997 P.2d 305, 308. 
Under this model, the Court first looks to find "language in the statute that 
reveals explicit legislative to preempt common law. Id. If this explicit language 
does not appear, the court considers "whether the statute's structure and purpose 
or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit 
preemptive intent." Id. This preemptive intent may become apparent a) when the 
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statute "creates a scheme of statutory regulation so pervasive" that it is reasonable 
to infer, "that the legislature left no room for the common law to supplement it," 
b) when the statutory law is "in irreconcilable conflict with the common law," or 
c) when the common law stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of the legislature." Id. at 308-09 
(citing Barnett Bank of marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25. 31. 116S.Q. 1103, 
1104 (1996)(internal quotations and marks omitted). 
Under this model analysis, it is clear that the Utah's Dramshop Act does not 
preempt the common law as it may apply to the U.S. Government. The Act does 
not expressly preempt the common law of liability. Nor do the statute's structure, 
purpose and language reveal an intent to preempt the common law as it may apply 
to the sale and distribution of alcohol by the U.S. Government. Instead, the 
legislature left room for the common law to supplement the Act; there is no 
conflict between the common law and the Act in this case; and here the common 
law offers a means to more fully fulfill the purposes of the Act. 
1. Utah's Dramshop Act Does Not Expressly Preempt 
The Common Law 
Utah's Dramshop Act does not expressly preempt the common law of 
liability for liquor distribution by the U.S. Government. See Utah Code Ann. 
32A-14-101, et seq.; Id at ^ 12, 309. The Act does except the State, as well as its 
agencies, employees and political subdivisions from any civil liability "arising out 
of their activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being 
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involved in the sale or other distribution of alcoholic beverages." Utah Code Ann. 
§ 32A-14-102 (1999 Repl). See Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685 
(1989)(holding that explicit language of Act precluded liability of employee of 
State-owned NCO Club under the Act). However, the Act is notably silent as to 
the liability of the U.S. Government. Thus, the question becomes whether the 
statute's structure, purpose and language reveal an intent by the Legislature to 
preempt the common law of liability as to the U.S. Government. 
2. The Structure And Language of Utah's Dramshop Act 
Do Not Reveal An Intent To Apply Act To The U.S. 
Government 
The structure and language of the Act do not reveal an intent to preempt the 
law of liability for the sale and distribution of alcohol by the U.S. Government. 
While a[t]he Act evidences an overall scheme of regulation of liability for liquor 
providers,"9 this scheme extends only to state-licensed providers of alcohol. In 
fact, the structure and language of Title 32A indicates that the U.S. Government is 
decidedly not considered or regulated by Utah's Dramshop Act. 
Title 32A applies to "alcoholic beverage control in this state except where 
local authorities are expressly granted regulatory control." Utah Code Ann. § 
32A-1-102(3) (1990 Amd.). However, "local authority" is defined as "the 
legislative body" of a county if unincorporated "or the governing body" of a city 
or town if incorporated. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(25)(1990 Amd.). Notably, 
9Gilger, at 512, 309. 
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even Title 32A's definition of "public building" does not include structures owned 
or leased by the U.S. Government10, despite the existence of federal military 
installations in Utah since before statehood and the relative comprehensiveness of 
the regulatory scheme, there is no mention of application to the U.S. Government. 
Further, the plain language of the Dramshop Act indicates a legislative 
awareness and acceptance of remedies outside of the specific statutory remedies. 
Subsection (4) does not expressly limit the type of remedy but provides that "[a] 
person who suffers injury under Subsection (1) or (2) has a cause of action against 
the person who provided the alcohol" Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(4) (1999 
Repl.). While Subsection (8) provides that "[njothing in this chapter precludes 
any cause of action or additional recovery against the person causing the injury. 
Id. Thus, while a cause of action does lie for persons, like the Millers, who are 
injured as the result of a person providing alcohol in violation of the Act, the cause 
of action is not of necessity at statutory cause of action, nor are other causes of 
action precluded or preempted by the Act. 
Construed liberally so as to effect the purpose of the Drampshop Act and to 
further justice, the language and structure of Utah's Dramshop does not preempt 
common law causes action, which impose liability upon the U.S. Government. 
10
 Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(38)(1990 Amd.) defines a public building as "any 
building or permanent structure owned or leased by the state, a county, or local 
government entity that is used for public education, transacting public business, or 
regularly conducting government activities." 
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Supplementation By The Common Law 
The permissive language in Subsections (4) and (8), combined with the lack 
of any reference to the U.S. Government, which procures and distributes alcohol 
in Utah, in both the Act and Title 32A as a whole, is evidence of legislative intent 
to allow the common law to supplement statutory provisions of the Act. This 
Court has already recognized that there is room to supplement the statutory 
remedies provided by Utah's Dramshop Act for the negligent and improper 
provision of alcohol with the common law. See Yost v. State; MacKay v. 7-
Eleven Sale Corp. Further, one must assume that the Legislature was aware that 
the operation of the FTC A as interpreted by federal courts would preclude the 
strict statutory liability imposed by the Act, when it did not include the actions of 
the U.S. Government within the provisions of Title 32A. Thus, leaving the 
common law to supplement the statutory provisions of the Act. 
Conflict Between The Act And The Common Law 
In this case there is no conflict between the common law and Utah's 
Dramshop Act, insofar as the common law imposes liability on the U.S. 
Government for the harm caused to the Millers by the negligence of its Federal 
Employee, in continuing to serve Mr. Valle past the point where that Employee 
knew or should have known Mr. Valle was intoxicated, when the Act (and the 
Title that contains it) does not reach the acts of a U.S. Government bartender on a 
military base within the State. Indeed, f,[i]t would be incongruous if in 
circumstances where the state has cast its net wider than in a traditional negligence 
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action, a Government employee is automatically excused from liability even if his 
negligence can be proved." Smith v. Pena, 621 F.2d 873, 880 (7th Cir. 1980). 
The Common Law Is A Vehicle Vehicle For Furtherance 
Of The Legislative Aims of the Act 
Finally, in this case, the common law does not stand as a barrier to 
effectuating the purposes and objectives of the legislature in enacting Utah's 
Dramshop Act. The three basis purposes of dramhop legislation are punishment, 
regulation and compensation. See Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, f 16, 
996 P.2d 540, 544 (Durham, J., dissenting); GUger, 2000 UT 23,1J29, 997 P.2d 
305, 314 (Durham, J., dissenting). Applying the common law to the instant case 
furthers all three of theses objectives, in a manner that the Act, by itself cannot. 
Application of the common law to this case provides for punishment for the 
U.S. Government's wrongful and negligent acts, in the form of financial 
obligations to parties injured by those act. This financial disincentive for bad acts 
acts as a regulatory force on care the U.S. Government exercises in serving 
alcohol in the State. Finally, the application of the common law to the acts of the 
U.S. Government provides compensation to persons injured as a result of its 
negligent acts. 
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C. Constitutional Issues in Preemption Under The Open Courts 
Provision of the Utah Constitution/ 
Further support for the assertion that the common law is not preempted by 
Utah's Dramshop Act is found in an application of the strictures of the Open 
Courts provision of Utah's Constitution, which provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done 
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have 
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered 
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be 
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in 
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he 
is a party. 
Article I, Section 11, Utah Const. 
To determine if a statute unconstitutionally limits one's right to remedy by 
due course of law for injury to one's "person, property, or reputation" under 
Article I, section 11, we must apply the the two-part test first set forth in Berry v. 
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985). Horton v. Goldminer's 
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1987), When reviewing statutes for 
constitutionality, a statute is presumed constitutional, and the Court will''resolve 
any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Society of Separations, Inc. v. 
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993). 
Under the Berry analysis, the Court must first determine "if the law 
provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy by due 
course of law for vindication of his constitutional interest." Horton, at 1094. The 
benefit provided by the substitute remedy "must be substantially equal in value or 
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other benefit to the remedy abrogated . . . although the form of the substitute 
remedy may be different." Id. If the law provides this substantially equal 
substitute remedy, then the requirements of Section 11 are satisfied. Id. If, 
however, "no substitute or alternative remedy provided," this abrogation is only 
justified "if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the 
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means 
for achieving the objective." Id. 
Here, if as the United States claims that the Millers are entitled to no 
remedy under the Utah Dramshop Act, through preemption and operation of the 
FTC A, then the Act, as applied,11 is unconstitutional under the Article I, Section 
11. First, under the this theory, the Millers would be totally deprived of all 
remedies, both statutory and common law, as the application of the interpretation 
forwarded by the United States afford no effective and reasonable alternative 
remedy. Second, no social or economic evil is eliminated. Indeed, the clear social 
or economic evils to be eliminated was recognized by the Utah Legislature and 
addressed with the enactment of Utah's Dramshop Act, and the interpretation of 
Utah law forwarded by the United State perpetuates rather than eliminates those 
evils. Accordingly, this interpretation and application of Utah law would be 
unconstitutional. 
11
 It is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether Utah's Dramshop Act is 
unconstitutional on is face. The Plaintiffs simply contend that it is 
unconstitutional as applied to this case's unique factual setting as a result of the 
application of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
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Under the foregoing analysis, the interpretation of Utah law forwarded by 
the United States, wherein the Millers' common law remedies against the U.S. 
Government are preempted by Utah's Dramshop Act and Utah's Dramshop Act, 
as it applies to the U.S. Government, is preempted through operation of federal 
law, is unconstitutional under the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
Accordingly, the common law as it applies to the U.S. Government is not 
preempted. 
D. Equal Protection under the Utah Constitution. 
The State of Utah's Constitution contains an Equal Protection Clause. Utah 
Const. Art. I, § 24. That constitutional provision is not interpreted the same as the 
Federal Constitution in every instance. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake 
City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). Even when the rational basis test is 
utilized, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "to pass state constitutional 
muster, a legislative measure must often meet a higher de facto standard of 
reasonableness than would be imposed by the federal courts." Id. at 889. On the 
other hand, when a fundamental liberty or suspect class12 is involved, the Utah 
Supreme Court has implied that strict scrutiny would apply: 
Although we have not expressly addressed the question under 
the state constitution, at least one judge has indicated that a 
strict scrutiny test would be appropriate under article I, 
section 24. 
See Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (1941)(Wolfe, J., concurring). 
i o 
The Plaintiffs do not contend that a suspect class is involved. 
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In determining whether strict scrutiny should apply, the following 
discussion by the Utah Supreme Court is enlightening as it pertains to fundamental 
liberty under Utah law: 
The protection of such basic personal interests from the 
power of temporary majorities to infringe them is a primary 
function of a constitution. Certainly, the right to the 
protection of the law for one's person, property, and 
reputation is a right that is as essential to the happiness of an 
individual as is liberty. While democracy is the mainspring 
of our republican form of government, the founders of this 
state and this nation knew that certain basic rights could be 
rooted in law more effectively than can be accomplished by 
relying on the sometimes fickle goodwill of the popular 
organs of government for their protection. 
Horton, 785P.2dat 1091. 
Horton involved a Utah statute that prevented a plaintiff from seeking 
redress for personal injuries (the statute was declared unconstitutional under 
Article I, section 11). The Millers respectfully ask this Court to consider the right 
to redress wrongs in a civil action to be a fundamental right, equivalent to a 
citizen's liberty in the eyes of the Utah Constitution. Strict scrutiny should be 
applied to determine if the United States application of Utah's Dramshop Act is 
constitutional. 
Certainly, there would have been a less restrictive alternative available to 
the legislature: such as stating in the Dramshop Act that if strict liability does not 
apply to a defendant, negligence will. Thus, the State of Utah's policy of 
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compensating victims of intoxicated individual's acts would be equally applied to 
everyone. 
While the strict scrutiny test is more rigorous than the rational basis test, the 
Utah Dramshop Act, (if interpreted as argued by the US Government), does not 
pass the rational basis test. There is no rational basis for passing an act that 
disallowed recovery because the plaintiff was injured as a result of alcohol being 
served on an Air Force base when recovery would be allowed had the alcohol been 
served at a tavern a mile away off base. When applied under the government's 
analysis, the act is clearly unconstitutional. Thus, no preemption is possible, and 
Society of Separations, Inc., 870 P.2d at 920, requires that this Court resolve this 
issue in a manner consistent with the Utah Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold 
that a federal government employee, who ordinarily would be immune from suit in 
cases of strict liability, may be liable under the principles of common law, under 
Utah's Dramshop Act, if the plaintiffs establish negligence. 
Application of the common law to third-party tort claims, for acts not 
reached by the Act, is consistent with the interests of justice, the previous rulings 
of this court, the intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting the Act, the public 
policy of the State of Utah, the jurisprudence of several sister states, the well 
established policy of the courts of Utah and the open courts provision of the Utah 
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Constitution. Accordingly, this Court should find that the common law of Utah 
recognizes a right of action by a third party against a seller of alcoholic beverages, 
who is not subject to the provisions of Utah's Dramshop Act, when the third party 
has suffered injury at the hands of an intoxicated person and where the seller 
negligently continued to serve the intoxicated person in violation of Utah's 
statutory prohibition. This Court should further hold that Utah's Dramshop Act 
does not preempt such causes of action. 
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